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Abstract: To address the efficiency and sustainability of residential sub-
urbanization under state leasehold systems, this study examines the price 
formation of long-term land-use rights for general and compensational 
housing empirically, considering the successive expansions of new metro 
lines and highway networks during 2004–2016 in Shanghai—one of 
the world’s fastest growing megacities. The results of our spatial autore-
gressive models infer that the accessibility benefits of metro extensions 
are considerably capitalized into both the ask and transaction prices of 
land-use rights for general housing in the suburbs, whereas those for 
highway construction are insignificant. A series of spatiotemporal re-
gressions demonstrate that the premiums for proximity to new metro 
stations bid by private developers are much higher than those asked by 
local governments during pre-metro years, probably due to local govern-
ments’ strategic site arrangements for transit-oriented suburbanization 
and/or developers’ speculative land acquisitions in Shanghai’s upward 
suburban housing market. This study further reveals that the prices of 
land-use rights for compensational housing do not reflect any economic 
externalities attributable to metro stations and highway interchanges, 
which might trigger the unfair redistribution of property rights, acces-
sibility, and economic opportunities among relocated farmers around 
city-fringe areas.
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1 Introduction
Global concerns over environmental degradation and socioeconomic disparity arising from suburban 
sprawl have called for empirical research and scientific evidence on transportation infrastructure invest-
ment, metropolitan-scale land management, and subsequent human landscape across regions (UN-
Habitat, 2011). Intergovernmental scholars acknowledge that the 21st century’s global population 
growth will take place mostly around city fringes in developing countries, and the greatest policy chal-
lenges for environmental mitigation and socioeconomic inclusion would appear in rapidly expanding 
areas, where urban transportation infrastructure and human settlement patterns are not yet locked in 
(Seto et al., 2014). Regarding policy approaches, a good combination of transit-supportive spatial strate-
gies and market initiatives is expected to alter the pace and shape of suburbanization along a sustainable 
pathway, particularly in emerging economies.
From this global perspective, the experiences of fast growing cities in China have gained special at-
tention over the past two decades (e.g., Gaubatz, 1999; Ma, Lu, & Sun, 2008; Wang, Kundu, & Chen, 
2010; Zhou & Ma, 2000). One critical viewpoint associated with Chinese cities’ suburbanization is on 
the high rates of motorization. As a consequence of the open-door policy and rising household income, 
both private vehicle ownership and vehicle-kilometers traveled continue to grow considerably along 
with the consecutive extensions of radial and ring highway networks with the scope of inducing mobility 
in China’s city-fringe markets (Gakenheimer, 1999; Kenworthy & Hu, 2002; Kenworthy & Townsend, 
2002; Shen, 1997; Zhao, 2010; Zhao, Lü, & de Roo, 2010). However, car-dependent suburbanization 
has been widely recognized as a major driver of severe traffic congestion, air pollution, noise, wasteful 
energy use, greenhouse gas emissions, and social inequality regarding accessibility across the growing 
metropolitan areas in China (Pucher, Peng, Mittal, Zhu, & Korattyswaroopam, 2007; Martin, 2007; 
Yan & Crookes, 2010).
In response to these looming environmental and socioeconomic threats, Chinese cities’ policy para-
digms have progressively been shifting from mobility-induced engineering to accessibility-enhanced 
planning. In recent metropolitan-wide spatial strategies, effective integration of land use and public 
transportation or transit-oriented development (TOD) is noticeably encouraged as an alternative form 
of sustainable suburbanization (Cervero, 2013; Lyu, Bertolini, & Pfeffer, 2016; Pan, Shen, & Liu, 2011; 
Suzuki, Cervero, & Iuchi, 2013). In fact, high-density housing developments with small-size blocks and 
well-connected street networks around transit stations are estimated to curb suburban households’ car 
ownership rates and motorized travel footprints via enhanced accessibility in large metropolitan areas, 
such as Shanghai (Cervero & Day, 2008; Day & Cervero, 2010; Pan, Shen, & Zhang, 2009). 
Essentially, the Chinese version of TOD has been adopted along with new metro transit systems 
(Zhang, 2007). Over the past 15 years, major coastal and inland cities have successively delivered large-
scale metro projects using public-private partnership schemes not only to mitigate the environmental 
impacts of suburban sprawl, but also to generate wider economic benefits or land productivity gains 
through metropolitan-wide accessibility improvements (Chang, 2013; Chang & Phang, 2017; Loo & 
Li, 2006; Shen, Jiao, He, & Li, 2015). Nevertheless, facing greater funding gaps, capital-intensive metro 
extension practices have increasingly tapped into municipal revenues from sales of long-term land-use 
rights under China’s municipal leasehold system, the financial sustainability becoming more susceptive 
to the profitability and volatility of real estate markets (Chang, 2014, Suzuki, Murakami, Hong, & 
Tamayose, 2015). 
In search of sustainable suburbanization and infrastructure finance, a growing body of empirical re-
search analyzes the impacts of metro investments on residential property markets based on the bid-rent 
theory advanced by Alonso (1964), Muth (1964), and Mills (1972). Various hedonic price studies have 
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been conducted to measure metro accessibility benefits from private housing sales or rents in Beijing 
(Xu, Zhang, & Aditjandra, 2016; Zhang, Meng, Wang, & Xu, 2014; Zhang & Wang, 2013; Zheng & 
Kahn, 2008), Shanghai (Pan & Zhang, 2008; Wang, Feng, Deng, & Cheng, 2016), Guanzhou (Tian, 
2006), and Wuhan (Huang & Yin, 2015; Xu & Zhang, 2016). The market capitalization effects esti-
mated across these major cities are positive if accompanied by transit-supportive land-use coordination 
in a specific radius from metro stations. Housing price analyses reveal some end consumers’ transit-
oriented living preferences for short- or mid-term tenancies on the housing market, but little is known 
about intermediate transactions for long-term land-use rights under China’s municipal leasehold system 
(Yang, Chen, Le, & Zhang, 2016).
The leasehold administration for land-use control and local public finance over the past two de-
cades has been challenged as a serious cause of suburban sprawl, land speculation, and housing unaf-
fordability in China’s large metropolitan areas (Man, 2012; Xie, Parsa, & Redding, 2002; Zhang, 2000; 
Zhu, 2002). Particularly, de facto landowners (e.g., state-owned enterprises, danwei, collectives, and 
military agencies) transferred land-use rights to private developers unofficially, which led to inefficient 
land supply and ad hoc property development. Additionally, city-state agencies set low compensation 
prices for farmland requisition without any clear standards, and converted countryside excessively into 
residential and industrial areas (Ding, 2007; Han, 2000; Lichtenberg & Ding, 2008). In a series of 
policy reforms, the establishment of land banking systems since the late 1990s has consolidated the local 
regulatory power to control the transfer of land-use rights for accountable and sustainable resource al-
locations, whereas housing affordability and the fair redistribution of property rights for landless farmers 
have remained important socioeconomic considerations (Ding, 2003; He, Liu, Webster, & Wu, 2009; 
Tian & Ma, 2009; Xu, Yeh, & Wu, 2009; Zhang, 2012). 
Nevertheless, there is a paucity of empirical research on the nexus between land leasehold admin-
istration and transportation infrastructure investment as a critical path toward sustainable suburbaniza-
tion in China (Yang et al., 2016; Yang, Quan, Yan, & He, 2016). This paper contributes to limited 
literature by providing new spatiotemporal evidence on transportation and land-use coordination under 
public leasehold in several distinctive ways. First, it empirically analyzes parcel-level transaction records 
for long-term land-use rights within the Shanghai metropolitan area during the growth period of 2004–
2016. Second, the land transaction analysis estimates the price formation of long-term land-use rights 
spatiotemporally attributable to the successive extensions of both metro and highway networks along 
with other local public goods. Third, the price premiums (or discounts) for proximity to new metro 
stations and highway entrances asked by district governments (as initial land suppliers) and bid by devel-
opers (as intermediate land consumers and property suppliers) are respectively scrutinized. Finally, two 
categories of residential land transactions—general and compensational housing—are distinguished to 
better understand the market efficiency and social inequity brought by car-dependent sprawl and/or 
transit-oriented suburbanization. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background of Shang-
hai, with respect to its spatial transformation, transportation investment, and land administration char-
acteristics. Section 3 presents the datasets used to analyze the case of Shanghai. After the methodology 
and regression results are presented in Section 4, conclusive empirical findings, policy implications, and 
analytical challenges are discussed in Section 5.
2 The Shanghai case
Shanghai has one of the world’s most populous administrative areas, being home to around 24 mil-
lion inhabitants in a total area of 6,340 km2. According to the 2014 Revision of World Urbanization 
Prospects (United Nations, 2014), the megacity has grown by absorbing nearly 10 million people over 
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the last two decades and is projected to attain approximately 7 million more residents by 2030, thus 
putting more pressure on housing development and residential suburbanization across its jurisdictional 
territories. By general definition, Shanghai’s administrative boundary consists of seven urban and nine 
suburban districts, including Chongming district’s three islands. District governments arrange detailed 
development plans and implement land leasing programs, whereas Shanghai’s municipal government 
rules a territory-wide masterplan and provides major infrastructure and services, such as metro, roads, 
green spaces, schools, and healthcare systems.
Over the past two decades, Shanghai’s motorization has grown to a relatively moderate degree, 
partly due to the effectiveness of its vehicle ownership control (Chen & Zhao, 2013). However, regard-
ing infrastructure, highway constructions continued to grow at a fast pace until 2007, the total network 
length reaching 825 km by 2015 (Shanghai Statistical Bureau, 2016). In addition to such massive 
automobility provisions, public transportation infrastructure and services, especially metro networks, 
have progressively been promoted as modal alternatives for environmental sustainability and economic 
progress. Around the early 2000, Shanghai operated four metro lines with a total length of 62.9 km. By 
the end of 2016, the city had China’s largest metro system with 13 lines in operation and a total length of 
617.5 km, thus catching up with the multiple radial and ring highway network. Remarkably, five more 
metro lines are under construction, with a plan to cover Shanghai’s densely urbanized and rapidly sub-
urbanizing territories with a network of 1,000 km and to be operational by 2020. These metropolitan-
wide metro extensions are expected to not merely meet mounting mobility needs, but rather prevent 
wasteful sprawling along with the adoption of transit-oriented land-use principles around the city-fringe 
districts of Shanghai (Pan et al., 2011; Pan & Zhang, 2008).
Given the importance of leasehold administration in land management and municipal finance, 
Shanghai established China’s first land banking system in 1996, one of the most successful local finance 
models among major Chinese cities. Indeed, the municipal government saved fiscal reliance on the sales 
of land-use rights by an average of 22.3% of its total revenue for 2004–2016,1 even when significant 
capital was needed to deliver a series of metro projects across urban and suburban districts. Furthermore, 
according to our preliminary interviews with local planning officials, Shanghai’s land leasing program is 
implemented at the district government level and the revenues generated from transactions for long-
term land-use rights are shared between each district and the municipal government, usually at a ratio 
of eight to two. In other words, Shanghai’s leasehold administration practices have been weakly linked 
to the municipal government’s infrastructure financing motives.
Using the majority of Shanghai’s leasehold revenues, district governments have been increasingly 
required to carry out land requisition and compensation tasks in cases of rapid suburbanization. To 
improve the fairness of land requisition, a market-based valuation mechanism has been encouraged 
through multiple compensation methods (Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, 2009). In Shang-
hai, the provision of compensational housing has been largely implemented through district govern-
ments’ land leasing programs since 2010. Typically, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private develop-
ers are invited to tender for the construction of compact and affordable compensational housing units 
within relocated farmers’ original districts, which cannot be resold within three years and are used as 
mortgage collateral (Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, 2011). After construction, the district 
governments repurchase land-use rights for compensational housing and transfer new housing units to 
farmers. Developers generally obtain about 10% net profit from compensational housing projects, al-
though the district governments’ repurchase prices vary by project. This in-kind compensation exercise, 
accompanied by general housing development and major transportation investment, reconfigured hu-
man settlement patterns noticeably and characterizes socioeconomic alterations across Shanghai’s city-
center and city-fringe jurisdictions.
1We compute the proportion of land leasing income in Shanghai’s total revenue. The annual land leasing revenue is calculated 
based on the transaction records of all land parcels from 2004 to 2016, as extracted from the official website of Shanghai’s Land 
Resources and Planning Bureau at http://www.shgtj.gov.cn/.
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3 Data organization
The datasets to analyze the case of Shanghai have largely three attributes: residential land transactions; 
major transportation infrastructure; and other local public goods. First, parcel-level data on all land 
transaction records for housing development in Shanghai (except Chongming County) during 2004–
2016 are extracted from the Shanghai Land Resource and Planning Bureau’s website (www.shgtj.gov.
cn). Each transaction record includes detailed information on street-level address, site area, permitted 
floor area ratio (FAR), land-use type, ask price, transaction price, transaction date, auction type (auction 
or listing), and buyer identity (names of successful bidders). After excluding 83 unsuccessful transaction 
cases, 1,088 transacted land parcels are used for our empirical analyses. 
Second, to control for inflation, both ask and transaction prices for 2004–2015 are adjusted by the 
consumer price index for 2016. More importantly, the final prices bid by developers (as intermediate 
land consumers and property suppliers), which consider market returns and project risks, are notice-
ably different from the initial prices asked by the governments (as land suppliers), which account for 
firm asset valuation or formula. Hence, the “bid-ask spread”—the transaction price divided by the 
ask price—is calculated to determine the government’s assessment and market profitability (or market 
speculativeness) of long-term land-use rights under various locational and temporal conditions. 
Based on land-use types, land transactions were originally classified into three housing categories: 
single-use residential, mixed-use residential, and compensational (called Huiqian House). However, 
since the fundamental characteristics of land transactions for single- and mixed-use housing were found 
to be almost identical in our preliminary analyses, we combine these two types into one “general” group. 
As such, two categories of residential land transactions—general housing and compensational hous-
ing—are respectively analyzed. In Shanghai, almost all land parcels are leased through listing (called 
“two-stage auction”) and less than 5% of them are transacted trough tendering (called “sealed bid”).2  No 
land parcels are leased out through regular “English auction” processes in Shanghai, although this is 
widely used in other Chinese cities. By identifying the names of successful bidders, we find that around 
27% of the residential land parcels are leased out to SOEs.
From the recorded street-level addresses, we geocode all transacted residential land parcels using a 
geographic information system (GIS). Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of land transactions for 
both general and compensation housing. Note that 88.7% of the land parcels for general housing and 
92.7% of those for compensational housing were the suburban districts over the past decade. The GIS 
data on residential land transactions for general and compensational housing are spatiotemporally re-
lated to those on major transportation infrastructure—metro stations and highway interchanges—that 
were geocoded from the locations of metro stations and highway entrances found on Shanghai’s govern-
ment website,3 as shown in Figure 2. Specifically, straight distances to the closest metro station or high-
way interchange (spatial) and year differences between transaction and infrastructure opening dates 
(temporal) are computed for each land parcel. The proportion of residential land transactions within 1 
km of both existing and future (within four years) metro stations is 26.0% for general and 16.8% for 
compensational housing. 
2Land prices through tending are typically lower than those through listing and English auction. For tending, local govern-
ments determine the winners largely based on bidders’ credibility and social responsibility rather than the amount bid. Cai, 
Henderson, and Zhang (2013) provide detailed explanations for different auction modes.
3The metro stops can be found on Shanghai metro website at http://service.shmetro.com/en/. Details on highway entrances 
can be found through Shanghai’s government data service at http://www.datashanghai.gov.cn/home
6 JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT AND LAND USE 12.1
Figure 1. Spatial distribution of land transactions for housing development in Shanghai, 2004–2016
(a) 2004                                                                                            (b) 2016
Figure 2. Transportation infrastructure extensions, 2004–2016
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Similarly, a range of local public goods are geocoded and spatially associated with GIS data for all 
residential land transactions in Shanghai. The office addresses of the city and 19 (former) district govern-
ments are used to denote the city center (mono-centricity) and sub-centers (poly-centricity), as those old 
jurisdictions predetermined Shanghai’s fundamental spatial structure with their provision of basic public 
services over the past decades.4 Each district contains a dozen of Jiedaos and towns, Shanghai’s smallest 
administrative units. By combining adjacent Jiedaos and towns with similar population density, we 
distinguish 59 zones (seven zones in the urban areas and 52 zones in the suburban areas)5 to control for 
unobservable sub-district effects. We also identify urban parks and universities as countable local public 
goods to be considered in analyzing residential land transactions. Note that, in Shanghai, these features 
existed before the land transaction period (2004–2016). Therefore, the straight distances from land to 
local public goods are regarded as static variables, while those from land to the closest metro stations and 
highway entrances are treated as dynamic variables. Table 1 summarizes all variables organized for the 
two types of residential land, respectively.
Table 1. Variable definitions and summary statistics
4 From 2009 to 2015, three districts were merged. Therefore, there were 16 districts in Shanghai as of 2016.
5 In urban areas, each district is regarded as a zone. In suburban areas, the size of zones ranges from 50 km2 to 150 km2. 
Variable Description Land for general housing 
(2004–2016)
Land for compensational housing 
(2010–2016)
Observation Mean SD Observation Mean SD
Dependent
Land_TP Transaction price of a land parcel (CNY per square meter) 707 21519.17 28990.43 381 6567.03 8781.92
Land_AskP Ask price of a land parcel (CNY per square meter) 660 14341.38 18997.64 376 6629.8 8820.93
Bid-Ask Spread Defined by the transaction price divided by ask price 660 1.7048 0.8319 376 1 0
Attributes
Urban Binary, 1 = land transaction in urban districts, 0 = otherwise 707 0.1132 0.317 381 0.0735 0.2613
L_Size Size of land parcels, in meter2 707 68825.64 54596.91 381 54151.81 34033.35
FAR Permitted FAR for each land parcel 707 1.7899 0.6844 381 1.8633 0.4
SOE Binary, 1 = land purchased by a SOE developer, 0 = otherwise 707 0.2631 0.4406 381 0.273 0.4461
Tendering Binary, 1 = the auction type of the land parcel is tendering, 0 
= otherwise
707 0.0693 0.2542 381 0.0052 0.0724
Location & Access
C_Center Distance of a land parcel to city center, in meter, static vari-
able
707 29553.54 13528.53 381 28727.72 11685.77
D_Center Distance of a land parcel to its corresponding district center, 
in meter, static variable
707 9044.102 6732.96 381 9753.87 5886.71
Uni Distance of a land parcel to the closest university, in meter, 
static variable
707 6688.52 4635.9 381 7047.61 4209.91
Park Distance of a land parcel to the closest public park, in meter, 
static variable
707 5306.74 3177.62 381 5950.47 3824.65
HighW Distance of a land parcel to the closest highway entrances, in 
meter, dynamic variable
707 2247.8 1746.57 381 2502.4 1507.9
Metro Distance of a land parcel to the closest metro stop, in meter, 
dynamic variable
707 7990.17 8989.68 381 5792.6 5965.02
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4 Empirical analysis
This study assesses whether Shanghai’s land price formation for housing provisions (or residential sub-
urbanization process) is spatiotemporally associated with the extensions of major transportation infra-
structure along either transit-oriented and/or car-dependent pathways by analyzing the intermediate 
transfers of long-term land-use rights from the district governments to housing developers in three sets 
of regressions for: (1) transaction prices; (2) ask prices and bid-ask spreads; and (3) transaction prices, ask 
prices, and bid-ask spreads with time effects. Major transportation investments are expected to reduce 
commuting costs and affect housing prices via accessibility improvements as well as amenity influences 
(e.g., traffic congestion, noise, and air pollution). Numerous studies typically estimate such capitaliza-
tion effects in end-consumer markets—housing sales or rents under freehold systems—using hedonic 
price methods based on the assumptions of utility theory (Rosen, 1974). We assume that similar price 
regressions could be applied to measure the valuation of dynamic metro extensions and highway con-
struction on the intermediate land markets for housing development under Shanghai’s leasehold system, 
wherein a sufficiently large number of initial land suppliers (district governments) and intermediate land 
consumers (housing developers) determine rational prices for major transportation infrastructure and 
other local public goods through local competition for long-term land-use rights (Tiebout, 1956; Wil-
son & Wildasin, 2004). Subsequently, developers acting as housing suppliers are likely to transfer these 
land prices (or land acquisition costs) to end-consumer markets through property sales or rents for the 
following years. From these theoretical and pragmatic understandings, Equation (1) is specified for the 
three kinds of land price regressions:
Pijt= α0+α1LCijt+α2PGij+α3TFijt+ηj+yt+εijt    (1)
Year lead/Lag time 
effect
D_MLead4 Binary, 1 = a land parcel located within 1 km of metro station 
four years ago, 0 = otherwise
707 0.0693 0.2542 381 0.0367 0.1884
D_MLead3 Binary, 1 = a land parcel located within 1 km of metro station 
three years ago, 0 = otherwise
707 0.0905 0.2871 381 0.0735 0.2613
D_MLead2 Binary, 1 = a land parcel located within 1 km of metro station 
two years ago, 0 = otherwise
707 0.1188 0.3238 381 0.0919 0.2892
D_MLead1 Binary, 1= a land parcel located within 1 km of metro station 
one year ago, 0 = otherwise
707 0.133 0.3398 381 0.1102 0.3136
D_Metro Binary, 1 = a land parcel located within 1 km of metro station 
in the same year, 0 = otherwise
707 0.1542 0.3614 381 0.1365 0.3438
D_MLag1 Binary, 1 = a land parcel located within 1 km of metro station 
one year later, 0 = otherwise
707 0.1825 0.3865 381 0.1496 0.3572
D_MLag2 Binary, 1 = a land parcel located within 1 km of metro station 
two years later, 0 = otherwise
707 0.2192 0.414 381 0.1575 0.3647
D_MLag3 Binary, 1 = a land parcel located within 1 km of metro station 
three years later, 0 = otherwise
707 0.2433 0.4294 381 0.1654 0.372
D_MLag4 Binary, 1 = a land parcel located within 1 km of metro station 
four years later, 0 = otherwise
707 0.2603 0.4391 381 0.168 0.3743
Notes: SD refers to standard deviation.
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where Pijt is a vector of the price of land parcel i in zone j and year t,  LCijt is a vector of the lease 
condition attributes (site area, FAR, auction type, and SOE dummy), PGij is a vector of the distance 
to local public goods (city center, district centers, universities, and large parks), TFijt is a vector of the 
distance to the closest major transportation facilities (metro station and highway interchange), ηj is a set 
of zone dummies to control for spatial heterogeneity among sub-districts, yt is a set of year dummies to 
control for unobservable time effects, εijt is a general error term, α0 is a constant, and α1, α2, and α3 are 
vectors of the coefficients of independent variables to be estimated. Note that our analysis applies full-
log regressions to improve model fitness, lessen the effects of heteroscedasticity, and discuss estimated 
coefficients as elasticities.
It is likely that the prices of land parcels revealed by governments and developers within a certain 
micro-geographic unit (e.g., neighborhood, residential community, or transportation catchment area) 
are mutually affected with each other – “spatial dependency” and/or the prices of land parcels revealed 
by governments and developers reflect the value of unobservable local attributes within the certain 
spatial unit – “spatial heterogeneity”, when transaction records are publicly open to both initial suppli-
ers (governments) and intermediate consumers (developers). Indeed, detecting the presence of micro-
geographic data clustering among land transactions in Shanghai, we anticipate that the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimator would produce biased results. To overcome the problem of neighborhood-scale 
spatial dependency and/or heterogeneity, we apply spatial autoregressive models (Drukker, Prucha, & 
Raciborski, 2011) as shown in Equations (2) and (3):
Pijt= α0+α1LCijt+α2PGij+α3TFijt+λWPijt+ηj+yt+εijt    (2)
εijt=ρWεijt+ μijt        (3)
where W is the spatial weight matrix (using the inverse distance between land parcels within 3 km) 
and λ and ρ are the parameters for spatial lag and error terms, respectively. Moran’s I statistics indicate 
that there is significant data clustering among land transactions for both general and compensational 
housing. After testing the spatial lag model (SLM), spatial error model (SEM), and general spatial 
model (GSM), we identify that SLM outperforms SEM and GSM based on the Lagrange multiplier 
(LM) test for robustness along with the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC) for fitness, although differences in coefficients among the three models appear minor. 
The specification of micro-geographic units for the spatial dependency of parcel-level land-use rights 
is essentially heuristic by testing a spectrum of distance-based spatial weight matrixes from 200 meters 
to 1600 meters for general housing and compensational housing, respectively, as the average scale of 
individual superblock neighborhood, agricultural community, or transportation catchment area within 
Shanghai’s urban and suburban zones can be identified in this distance range. The SLM results indicate 
that the spatial correlation is most significant within an 800-meter distance among land parcels for gen-
eral housing and a 400-meter distance for compensational housing, which seem consistent with those 
of other hedonic price studies specified in major Chinese city contexts (e.g., Wang et al., 2016; Xu & 
Zhang, 2016). 
4.1 Transition price models
The results of the regressions for transaction prices are summarized in Table 2. Columns (1) presents the 
results of SLM for general housing across urban and suburban areas. After all other effects are controlled 
for in the regressions, the capitalization effects of proximity to major transportation infrastructure are 
predicted contrastively. While the distance to nearest highway interchange is insignificant, the distance 
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to the closest metro station appears to be negatively associated with the transaction price at the 1% sig-
nificance level (elasticity = -0.1125).
As almost all land parcels are leased out in suburban districts, Columns (2) reports the result of 
SLM for general housing across suburban areas only. In these regressions, the distance to closest highway 
interchange also has no effect on transaction prices, but the distance to the closest metro station attains 
a negative price gradient at the 1% significance level (elasticity = -0.1061). 
Similarly, the results of SLM for compensational housing are reported in Columns (3)–(4). Re-
markably, these regression models show that closest metro station and highway interchange are not 
significantly related to transaction prices in both urban and suburban areas. However, lease conditions, 
such as the size of land parcels, FAR and auction type, largely determine land prices for compensational 
housing along with zone- and time-fixed effects. Note that the price decision mechanism of compensa-
tional housing is negotiation-based for public motives, which may not be able to account for the market 
value of accessibility sufficiently, while that of general housing is competition-based for private profits.  
Table 2. Results of SLM regressions for land transaction prices
Notes: The table shows the results for SLM regressions on the log land transaction price. The numbers in parentheses are stan-
dard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
4.2 Ask price and bid-ask spread models
Subsequently, models for ask prices and bid-ask spreads are estimated to measure how premiums for 
proximity to new metro stations and highway entrances are initially valuated by the district governments 
Land for General Housing-Log(Land_TP) Land for Compensational Housing-log(Land_TP)
(1)Full Samples (2)Suburban Samples (3)Full Samples (4)Suburban Samples
Log(C_Center) -0.4201***(0.1184) -0.8804***(0.1935) -0.2672(0.1854) -0.2196(0.2159)
Log(L_Size) -0.0422**(0.0218) -0.0402*(0.0231) -0.1083***(0.0394) -0.1127***(0.042)
Log(FAR) 0.4937***(0.0624) 0.5165***(0.0661) 1.5731***(0.1444) 1.5700***(0.1537)
SOE 0.0692*(0.0412) 0.0744*(0.0436) 0.0774(0.0566) 0.0894(0.0602)
Tendering -0.8512***(0.0959) -1.0786***(0.1146) -0.5889*(0.3245) -0.6136*(0.331)
Log(D_Center) -0.0355(0.04) -0.0983**(0.0467) 0.0358(0.067) 0.0831(0.0761)
Log(Uni) -0.0728*(0.0375) -0.0662(0.0411) -0.0896(0.0624) -0.1489** (0.0734)
Log(Park) -0.0876***(0.0193) -0.0802***(0.0203) 0.2452***(0.0536) 0.2302***(0.057)
Log(HighW) -0.0259(0.0247) -0.0267(0.0268) 0.0489(0.0391) 0.0490(0.0435)
Log(Metro) -0.1125***(0.0243) -0.1061***(0.0249) -0.0402(0.0382) -0.0349(0.0399)
Constant 15.7927***(1.1659) 21.1069***(1.9686) 9.6163***(1.8498) 9.3303***(2.1727)
Zones Y Y Y Y
Time Y Y Y Y
rho 0.0204***(0.0044) 0.0189***(0.0047) 0.0147**(0.0063) 0.0149**(0.0069)
Moran’s I 4.5263*** 4.9247*** 1.8807* 1.7577*
Robust LM 18.3361*** 13.3124*** 5.1386** 4.3841**
Lag > Error Y Y Y Y
Observation 707 627 381 353
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and how much they are increased by housing developers. These models are applied for general housing 
only, since the bid-ask spreads equal 1 for compensational housing. As around 10% of the transactions 
for general housing have no ask price records, the number of observations is reduced to 640. 
In Table 3, Columns (1)–(2) show the results of SLM for ask prices in all areas and suburban areas 
respectively, which are similar with those of SLM for transaction prices, as shown in Table 2. Essen-
tially, the distance to nearest highway interchange is assessed as an insignificant determinant, while the 
distance to nearest metro station has a negative price gradient at the 1% significance level (elasticity = 
-0.088 to -0.097). One notable difference from the transaction price models is that the SOE dummy is 
positively associated to ask prices, with a significant level at 1%. It can be presumed that some important 
land parcels are exclusively assigned to SOEs and their transaction prices are not competitively increased 
by private developers. 
Columns (3)–(4) further show the results of SLM for bid-ask spreads in all areas and suburban 
areas respectively, in a comparable manner. In short, two of the lease conditions (SOE and auction type) 
tend to be significant in explaining bid-ask spreads, but all other external attributes, seem to be statisti-
cally insignificant.
Table 3. Results of SLM regressions for land ask price and bid-ask spreads for general housing, 2004–2016
Notes: The dependent variable is the log ask price of land parcels for columns (1)–(2), and the log bid-ask spread of land parcels 
for columns (3)–(4). The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Log(Land_AskP) Log(Bid-Ask Spread)
(1)Full Samples (2)Suburban Samples (3)Full Samples (4)Suburban Samples
Log(C_Center) -0.4275***(0.0905) -0.6465***(0.1472) -0.0203(0.0884) -0.0852(0.1482)
Log(L_Size) -0.0151(0.017) -0.0183(0.0179) -0.0209(0.0166) -0.0200(0.018)
Log(FAR) 0.5732***(0.0499) 0.5784***(0.0534) -0.0226(0.0488) -0.0177(0.0538)
SOE 0.1121***(0.0305) 0.0993***(0.0319) -0.0558*(0.0297) -0.0511(0.0321)
Tendering -0.3434***(0.1286) -0.3277**(0.1359) -0.3219**(0.1252) -0.3481**(0.1362)
Log(D_Center) -0.0783***(0.0302) -0.1042***(0.0353) 0.0411(0.0291) 0.0278(0.0349)
Log(Uni) -0.0973***(0.0285) -0.1122***(0.0314) 0.0212(0.0278) 0.0289(0.0314)
Log(Park) -0.0862***(0.0146) -0.0815***(0.0155) -0.0025(0.0143) 0.0006(0.0156)
Log(HighW) -0.0090(0.0191) -0.0188(0.0206) -0.0015(0.0186) -0.0011(0.0207)
Log(Metro) -0.0974***(0.0183) -0.0884***(0.0188) -0.0163(0.0178) -0.0201(0.0188)
Constant 17.1991***(0.9009) 19.8293***(1.4935) 0.6726(0.8768) 1.3798(1.4987)
Zones Y Y Y Y
Time Y Y Y Y
rho 0.0126***(0.0035) 0.012***(0.0037) 0.1564***(0.0329) 0.1588***(0.0343)
Moran’s I 4.8167*** 4.8155*** 4.3327*** 4.1888***
Robust LM 11.397*** 16.442*** 12.1843*** 12.9877***
Lag > Error Y Y Y Y
Observation 640 575 640 575
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4.3 Transaction price, ask price, and bid-ask spreads with time effect models
Generally, the capitalization effects of transportation investment on property sales or rents under free-
hold systems are serially observed in different stages of a project, such as announcement, construction, 
and opening effects (e.g., Zheng & Kahn, 2013), which are likely to occur on the intermediate land 
market under Shanghai’s leasehold system. Specifically, temporal effects of the metro extensions are 
tested in regressions for transaction prices, ask prices, and bid-ask spreads using year leads and lags, 
which could partially mitigate the issue of causality between transportation infrastructure investments 
and housing price formation. 
Figure 3 illustrates the temporal distribution of residential land transactions within 1 km of new 
metro stations. The distribution of transactions for compensational housing is right-skewed, as a large 
majority of land parcels are leased out for compensational housing after the opening of metro stations. 
Conversely, the distribution of transactions for general housing appears to follow a normal distribution 
around the opening of metro stations, although nearly 25% of the land parcels for general housing were 
leased out during 1–2 years before new metro services became operational. As developers are generally 
required to develop land parcels within two years of the auction date, transfers of land-use rights from 
district governments seem to be proactively arranged around new stations in some years earlier.
Table 4 summarizes the temporal effects of metro extensions on transaction prices, ask prices, and 
bid-ask spreads estimated within 1 km of new stations, controlling for the influences of lease conditions 
and local public goods along with sub-district and year fixed effects. Column (1) shows that transaction 
prices within 1 km of new metro stations are significantly higher than those beyond 1 km, especially 
with metro year lag1 and lag2 (premium = +28.68% and +29.01%, respectively). Column (2) also 
indicates that ask prices within 1 km of new metro stations tend to be high, although the magnitude is 
lower than transaction prices. However, Column (3) further reports that year lead effects are insignifi-
cant in explaining bid-ask spreads, as developers are unwilling to pay extra premiums for land parcels 
around existing metro stations. Conversely, year lag effects are significantly positive since developers tend 
to proactively (or even speculatively) bid for land parcels within 1 km of forthcoming metro stations, 
especially with year lag1 and lag2 (additional premium = +14.41% and +11.89%, respectively). Finally, 
Column (4) reconfirms insignificant price premiums for compensational housing around metro stations 
regardless of year leads and lags.
Figure 3. Year lead/lag distribution of land transactions within 1 km of metro stations
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Table 4. Results of SLM regressions with time effect for land parcels located within a 1 km catchment area of metro stations
Notes: The table shows the results on the effect of metro stations on land price within a 1-km catchment area of metro stations. 
Columns (1)–(3) measures this lead/lag time effect for the log transaction price, log ask price and bid-ask spreads of residential 
land for general housing. Column (4) measures the lead/lag time effect for the log transaction price of land for compensational 
housing. Land attributes include log size of land parcels, FAR, SOE (dummy), tendering (dummy). The public good includes 
the distance of land parcels to district government center, universities, and parks. The numbers in parentheses are standard er-
rors. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
5 Conclusions
This study contributes to grasping the association of government land dispositions with transporta-
tion infrastructure extensions for the efficiency and sustainability of human settlements in emerging 
economies by an in-depth investigation of spatiotemporal price formation for long-term land-use rights 
regarding the successive expansions of metro and highway networks in Shanghai, China. The empirical 
results imply that the accessibility benefits of metro extensions are substantially capitalized into both 
the ask and transaction prices of land-use rights for general housing development in suburban districts, 
whereas the capitalization effects of highway constructions are insignificant. This price formation sug-
gests that both state-led spatial strategies and market-driven development initiatives have progressively 
been directing Shanghai’s residential suburbanization as transit-oriented rather than car-dependent over 
the past decade. 
However, the results also demonstrate that the premiums for proximity to new metro stations bid 
by developers appear to be much higher than those asked by district governments, especially within two 
years before new train services come into operation. The high premiums raised by developers during 
pre-metro years are likely to indicate speculative investments in Shanghai’s upward suburban hous-
General Residential Land Compensational Land 
(1) log(Land_TP) (2) log(Land_AskP) (3) log(Bid-Ask Spread) (4)log(Land_TP)
D_MLead4 0.2046**(0.0873) 0.2025***(0.0657) -0.0389(0.0633) 0.2291*(0.1291)
D_MLead3 0.2471***(0.0775) 0.1700***(0.0582) 0.0311(0.056) 0.0019(0.0917)
D_MLead2 0.2068***(0.0667) 0.1650***(0.0501) 0.0161(0.0484) -0.0280(0.0825)
D_MLead1 0.2060***(0.0623) 0.1740***(0.0483) 0.0039(0.0467) -0.0629(0.0765)
D_Metro 0.2730***(0.0575) 0.1440***(0.0446) 0.0948**(0.0429) 0.0157(0.0733)
D_MLag1 0.2868***(0.0542) 0.1110***(0.0425) 0.1441***(0.0406) 0.0326(0.0708)
D_MLag2 0.2901***(0.0503) 0.1383***(0.0404) 0.1189***(0.0389) 0.0308(0.0712)
D_MLag3 0.2243***(0.049) 0.1102***(0.0389) 0.0841**(0.0374) 0.0238(0.0686)
D_MLag4 0.2409***(0.0478) 0.1402***(0.0378) 0.0715*(0.0365) 0.0013(0.0676)
Log(C_Center) Y Y Y Y
Land Attributes Y Y Y Y
Public Good Y Y Y Y
Log(HighW) Y Y Y Y
Zones Y Y Y Y
Time Y Y Y Y
LM Test Y Y Y Y
Observation 707 640 640 381
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ing market (which can be different from the “net” impacts of metro extensions), whereas the prices of 
land-use rights for general housing asked by district governments are inaccurately pre-assessed without 
accounting for “construction” effects or intentionally discounted to promote proactive housing develop-
ment on strategically selected sites around new metro stations. In addition, this analysis reveals the fact 
that the prices of land-use rights for compensational housing do not reflect any economic externalities 
(or true market values) attributable to metro stations, highway interchanges, and other local public 
goods, which might further worsen uneven and unfair redistribution of property rights, accessibility to 
social opportunities, and, in turn, economic wealth among relocated farmers within and across Shang-
hai’s suburban districts.
These empirical findings lend credence to the accumulating evidence that China’s successive metro 
extensions could play a pivotal role in guiding human settlement patterns via metropolitan-wide acces-
sibility changes and curbing suburban sprawl using transit-supportive land-use arrangements and travel 
demand management techniques. While many hedonic price studies in China have built on Western 
literature on end-consumers’ transit-oriented housing preferences under market freehold systems, this 
study claims that the price formation of long-term land-use rights between local governments and pri-
vate developers must be spatiotemporally analyzed considering the provision of major transportation 
infrastructure and thoughtfully projected as a critical path of transit-oriented land management and lo-
cal capital improvement programs under state leasehold systems. Particularly, some policy measures for 
housing affordability and social inclusiveness need to be incorporated into the current TOD programs 
(or the TOD principles should be applied to the current compensational housing scheme). The policy 
implications drawn from the case of Shanghai are not limited to major cities in China but rather apply 
to several emerging megacities across the developing world, currently under similar state leasehold sys-
tems or that attempt to develop the administrative capacity to implement complex land management 
programs and deliver major transportation infrastructure projects regarding rapid suburbanization. 
In summary, this paper highlights five analytical challenges for future research. First, it focuses on 
residential land only, since the nature of commercial and industrial land appears to be fundamentally 
different as per our preliminary analyses and findings (Murakami & Chang, 2018). Grasping the dis-
tinctive characteristics of non-residential land transactions associated with local economic policies is 
scope for further research. Second, small cities with insufficient administrative capacity and market 
potential are beyond the scope of this case study. The methodology applied here should be adapted to as-
sess small cities’ leasehold administration practices with local-specific policy considerations and feasible 
land management techniques. Third, the key contribution of this study is its empirical findings, while 
China’s leasehold administration and municipal finance are highly political subjects. As such, follow-up 
qualitative research could further expose pragmatic implementations. Fourth, this research identifies 
the transfers of long-term land-use rights from initial land suppliers to intermediate land consumers 
as a critical path, but there remains the question of how the intermediate transactions would affect the 
formation of end-consumer markets around metro stations and highway interchanges. Comparative 
studies on land-use rights, property sales, and housing rents should be conducted for sequential periods 
in the same geographic area. Finally, the transit-oriented spatial strategies and market initiatives directed 
through intermediate transactions of land-use rights could not effectively meet environmental and so-
cioeconomic targets, if the high-priced housing properties built up around new metro stations were kept 
vacant for speculative purposes in end-consumer markets. As such, it is crucial to scrutinize the extensive 
influences of residential land transactions with respect to metro stations and highway interchanges on 
travel behavior alterations and key environmental/socioeconomic indicators via truly accessible and sus-
tainable human settlements in the coming years. 
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